Privacy Protection for Mobile Cloud Data: A Network Coding Approach by Chen, Yu-Jia & Wang, Li-Chun
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
07
07
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 J
an
 20
17
1
Privacy Protection for Mobile Cloud Data: A
Network Coding Approach
Yu-Jia Chen, Student Member, IEEE and Li-Chun Wang, Fellow, IEEE,
National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan
Email: allan920693@nctu.edu.tw and lichun@cc.nctu.edu.tw
Abstract—Taking into account of both the huge computing
power of intruders and the untrustedness of cloud servers, we
develop an enhanced secure pseudonym scheme to protect the
privacy of mobile cloud data. To face the huge computing power
challenge, we develop an unconditionally secure light-weight
network coding pseudonym scheme. For the privacy issue of
untrusted cloud server, we further design a two-tier network
coding to decouple the stored mobile cloud data from the owner’s
pseudonyms. Therefore, our proposed network coding based
pseudonym scheme can simultaneously defend against attackers
from both outside and inside. We implement our proposed two-
tier light-weight network coding mechanism in a group location
based service (LBS) using untrusted cloud database. Compared
to computationally secure Hash-based pseudonym, our proposed
scheme is not only unconditionally secure, but also can reduce
more than 90% of processing time as well as 10% of energy
consumption.
Index Terms—Privacy protection; big data and cloud comput-
ing; network coding; location based services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data collected from the sensors embedded in smartphones
offer great commercial potential for mobile cloud services,
but also pose new challenges on privacy protection. With
the properties of continuous changing and updated over time,
mobile data are particularly valuable for big data analytics
to understand and predict each individual behaviors. Because
mobile data provide highly personal information, the privacy
issues of mobile cloud data raise a lot of concerns [1].
However, using current security techniques to protect mobile
cloud data privacy will face a number of new challenges in
protecting mobile privacy [2]. First, we can no longer rely on
a protection mechanism with computational security assuming
that sophisticated cipher cannot be broken easily by attackers.
This is because the attackers become more powerful in the
era of cloud computing. Second, mobile devices with limited
computing power cannot conduct complex encryption and
decryption algorithms. Third, private mobile cloud data are
stored in public cloud servers, which increases the opportuni-
ties to be attacked by other cloud tenants.
To defend against malicious attackers with huge computing
power in outsourced database (ODB), we propose an uncon-
ditionally secure network coding based pseudonym scheme
to protect mobile privacy against the following two security
threats. First, for the outsider security threat, the ownership
information of mobile data is protected to the highest un-
conditional security level, in which the ciphertext will not be
broken even with infinite computation time. Since the inherent
distribution nature of network nodes is integrated into network
coding, it is impossible to decipher the complete plaintext
unless all the nodes are attacked. Secondly, for the insider
security threat from the attackers staying in the same ODB, we
develop a two-tier network coding technique for decoupling
data ownership. As a result, the insider attackers cannot know
the relationship of the stored data and their owners at all.
To demonstrate the advantages of our proposed network
coding privacy protection scheme, we implement it for a group
location based service (LBS) with ODB [3]. A group LBS can
help a group of users share their locations. Fig. 1 shows the
proposed security system model for group LBS. The privacy
issues of providing such a group LBS can be classified into
the following three aspects:
• Authenticating users’ data while preventing an untrusted
ODB provider from knowing the relation of a user and
his/her stored data [4];
• Sharing data with multiple members in the group of
interest while maintaining the same protection level as
the two user case [5];
• Storing data in a multi-tenant cloud computing environ-
ment with the threat of attackers staying in the same ODB
[6].
An unconditionally secure framework for mobile cloud ap-
plications has been rarely seen in the literature. Our proposed
unconditionally secure network coding based pseudonym
scheme can overcome the aforementioned three challenges,
and has the following two major contributions:
• A data ownership decoupling mechanism is presented,
which can achieve unconditional security level and re-
solve the security concerns for untrusted ODB.
• A light-weight network coding scheme is proposed which
can reduce the processing time by 90% compared to
the Hash-based pseudonym. A user only needs to en-
code his/her identity one time when logging in to the
trusted certifying server. The remaining operations for
pseudonym changing and uncloaking are performed by
the trusted certifying server. None of decoding operations
are needed in mobile terminals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related work for location privacy protection.
In Section III, we explain the system security model for
group LBS using ODB. In Sections IV and V, we present
the proposed network coding based pseudonym and analyze
its security performance. In Section VI, we discuss the issues
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Fig. 1. The proposed security model for a LBS system with outsourced database (ODB).
of data ownership, user authentication, and service continuity.
Section VII compares the performance of the proposed net-
work coding based pseudonym with Hash-based pseudonym.
Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In the literature, location privacy is generally protected by
either pseudonyms or anonymization.
A. Pseudonym-based Location Privacy Protection
Pseudonym techniques can protect location privacy by dis-
connecting a user’s location data with his/her genuine identity
[7]–[13]. Existing pseudonym schemes can be classified into
two types. The first type of pseudonym techniques aim to
change the pseudonyms intelligently so that the attacker cannot
distinguish the spatial difference from other members. The
authors of [7] proposed to frequently change pseudonyms
based on the mixed-zone concept, where users’ pseudonyms
are mixed together. In [10], disposable interface identifiers
were frequently assigned to users. When a node is not allowed
to disclose addresses, a silence period (defined as a transition
period between changing pseudonyms) was introduced [12].
When users’ pseudonyms in some area are changed after a
silence period, a hacker could not find the target user. In
[11], the pseudonym mechanism was improved by using a
Bayesian approach to resolve the frequency changing issue. In
[14], a game-theoretic model for the non-cooperative behavior
analysis of mobile nodes in a mixed zone was proposed. A
location proof updating system for vehicular networks was
designed in [10]. In [15], the authors proposed a dynamic
mixed zone of which the size is determined by the vehicle’s
predicted location, traffic statistics, and privacy requirement.
Another type of pseudonym techniques focus on designing
the unlinkable and irreversible pseudonym based on crypto-
graphic method. The Hash function is widely used to generate
a unique and secure pseudonym [13]. However, it has been
shown that attackers with computational power provided by
cloud computing can break Hash-based cryptography [16]. The
brute force method can deduce the original message from a
Hash value [17]. Furthermore, existing pseudonym techniques
cannot completely protect data ownership if an ODB provider
can link a particular pseudonym with its stored data in ODB
during an authentication process.
B. Anonymization-based Location Privacy Protection
Anonymization techniques can protect location privacy by
generalization and suppression techniques, i.e., with an expres-
sion of lower granularity. In [18] the k-anonymity concept was
introduced so that a user’s location cannot be distinguished
from other k − 1 users’ locations. Instead of reporting the
exact location, a user sends a region containing the locations
of other k − 1 people. In [19], the CliqueCloak algorithm
was proposed to provide different k-anonymous requirements
for each user. A privacy-preserving architecture for LBS with
different anonymization techniques was suggested in [20]. A
node density-based location privacy scheme was proposed
to improve anonymity without degrading quality of service
(QoS) [21]. The authors of [22] proposed a cluster based
anonymization scheme to replace the real node identities
with random identities generated by the cluster heads. In
[23], a clustering anonymization for vehicular networks was
developed to hide the road and traffic information. However,
all the above anonymization techniques cannot protect location
data shared by a group of users since an individual’s location
3is concealed.
C. Objective of This Paper
The objective of this paper is to improve location privacy
protection to unconditional security level and prevent an ODB
provider from linking a particular pseudonym with its stored
data. To our knowledge, privacy protection for group LBS in
the context of ODB has not been fully investigated. We suggest
to adopt network coding for pseudonym generation, which has
received little attention in the literature so far.
Network coding is a generalized routing method in which
messages are computed by intermediate nodes with algebraic
encoding. Previous works have shown that network coding can
provide robustness [24]–[26] and improve throughput [25],
[27] as well as confidentiality [28]. More recently, network
coding is employed to improve the security and reliability
of distributed storage systems such as recovering lost data in
multiple storage nodes [29], preventing eavesdropping over
untrusted networks [30] and checking integrity of outsourced
data [31].
Although it was proved that network coding possesses the
properties of irreversibility [32] and verifiable data integrity
[33], a stronger security property of network coding that can
achieve unlinkability between coded data has been rarely stud-
ied yet. In our previous work [34], the network coding based
pseudonym scheme and the corresponding security mechanism
for group LBS using ODB was introduced, but the security
analysis of the proposed mechanism is not yet investigated.
To this end, we develop a two-tier coding method to mix
user identity with watchword/seed and then generate two
keys for certification and anonymization. In this paper, on
top of the work in [34], we further analyze the security
performance of the proposed pseudonym scheme. We will
prove that network coding can provide unlinkable pseudonyms
to unconditional security level for group LBS by analysis.
It will be demonstrated that the proposed two-tier network
coding method can preserve the privacy of data ownership
even if an untrusted ODB provider has huge computing power.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Location Based Service (LBS) Applications Scenario
As mentioned before, the group LBS is considered as an
example to investigate the security performance issues for
mobile cloud applications. With users’ interests as well as
their locations, LBS system establishes a “group” of users
with the same interests to help customers’ meetup activities.
We implemented a location-based group scheduling service
on the ODB model, called JOIN [35], which can easily
arrange a meetup by sharing their current available time
and locations for polling, voting, and broadcasting. Fig. 2
illustrates a service scenario of JOIN, in which users A, B
and C join the “Let’s drink coffee” group. While user A is
approaching to his preferred coffee shop, users B and C are
nearby coincidentally. JOIN server will provide the proximity
information of its group members users B and C to customer
A, and the advertisements for this coffee shop. The locations
and activities of customers in this meetup will be stored in
Fig. 2. An illustrative example of a group LBS for scheduling a meetup.
the cloud database for future commercial promotions, such as
group coupon distribution.
In this group LBS application scenario, it is worthwhile
investigating the following security issues. First, customers
shall release their identities to the service provider and to other
group members. During the sharing process, it is likely that
a hacker will eavesdrop the location data and their identities.
Moreover, due to the use of ODB, an adversary can possibly
pretend to be an authorized user and then modify the cus-
tomers’ private information. Clearly, a more trustworthy LBS
provider needs to protect customers’ identities and location
data in a more sophisticated security mechanism.
B. Security Models and Assumptions
Figure 1 shows the proposed security model for a mobile
cloud system with ODB, consisting of users devices, a service
engine, cloud databases, and a trusted certifying server. The
service engine contains three major processors: the login
processor, service data processor (e.g., scheduling a meetup),
and service result translator (e.g., anonymization). The cloud
database stores the service information and location data.
Rather than in cloud databases, customers’ data are stored at
the certifying servers, consisting of authentication processor
and pseudonym processor. Referring to Fig. 1, the general
information flows of privacy preserved LBS are described as
follows.
1) Step 1: A customer sends his/her identification as well
as the device identification to the certifying server. Then
the authentication processor within the certifying server
verifies customers’ identities.
2) Steps 2 and 3: The login processor is activated to
respond the service requests of customers.
3) Steps 4 and 5: The customer sends the location data
to the service engine. Then the service processor can
access other service-related information from the cloud
database, such as the addresses of the nearby coffee
shops.
44) Steps 6 and 7: After receiving the privacy level re-
quested by the customer, the result translator sends the
pseudonym to the certificate server.
5) Step 8: The pseudonym processor “uncloaks” the
pseudonymous result.
6) Step 9: The simplified location records are stored in
the cloud database with various privacy levels. A low
privacy level could show group members at the scale
of street locations, whereas the high privacy level could
show your friends only at the scale of a city.
To make the privacy analysis more tractable, the considered
JOIN group LBS is implemented in an experimental platform,
invoking the following assumptions and conditions:
• A group of users trust each other so as to being willing
to share their locations and identities.
• The service provider and the cloud database provider are
semi-honest [36]. Hence, these providers shall follow the
protocol properly, while allowing them to keep all the
records of involved computations and data exchanges.
Noteworthily, under the semi-honest requirement, there still
exists a possibility of deriving private data of other parties
from the intermediate computation records.
IV. IMSI-BASED GROUP SECURITY (IGS) ALGORITHM
A. Algorithm Design
In this subsection, we present network coding based
pseudonym integrated with the international mobile subscriber
identity (IMSI). Stored in a subscriber identity module (SIM)
card, IMSI is a unique number associated with current mobile
phones to identify the subscribers. Current Android-based mo-
bile platform provides the application programming interface
(API) to access the IMSI number of mobile phones. Clearly,
location data themselves are not quite useful as long as a
hacker does not know the ownership of these data. Hence,
we propose to encrypt IMSI to conceal a customer’s privacy.
Fig. 3 (a) and (b) illustrate the basic idea of the proposed
IMSI-based group security (IGS) algorithm, in which a two-
tier coding scheme is developed to generate KeyA for authen-
ticating a legal customer’s identity, and KeyB (pseudonym)
for protecting customer’s private data (e.g., location). First,
KeyA is generated by mixing customers’ IMSI and customers’
watchwords, which are selected by customers as their secrets
to protect their IMSI information. Watchwords shall not be
revealed to any party. Second, mixing each customer’s KeyA
and a uniformly distributed random seed results in KeyB.
Note that the length of watchwords and random seed should
be longer than or equal to the length of the IMSI. The key
generation functions in the proposed two-tier coding scheme
shall satisfy the following two requirements even if the key
generation function is revealed: (1) difficult to obtain any
information from KeyA or KeyB; (2) difficult to obtain the
correspondence between KeyA and KeyB. We consider two
kinds of key generation functions in this paper.
• Hash function: It has been used extensively in the appli-
cations of message integrity checking and authentication,
such as message digest (MD5) and secure Hash algorithm
(SHA).
  (a) First tier:  IMSI + Watchword 
  (b) Second tier: KeyA + Random Seed 
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Fig. 3. Proposed two-tier coding scheme with encrypted international mobile
subscriber identity (IMSI), where KeyA and KeyB are used for authentication
and pseudonym generation, respectively.
• Network coding: In efficient routing and secure stor-
age schemes [32], network coding technique has been
adopted. Vandermonde transform matrix is the key ele-
ment in network coding.
Vandermonde matrix is used in our proposed two-tier network
coding scheme. Denote A as an n×n Vandermonde matrix,
where [Ai,j ] = (aij − 1) and the coefficients ai are distinct
nonzero elements in a finite field Fq , q = 2u > n. Let b =
(b1, . . . , bn)
T be the mix of IMSI and watchwords. Next, we
compute c = (c1, . . . , cn)T = Ab and randomly select the
segment of c as the key value in the two-tier network coding
scheme.
The aforementioned key generation functions can be
adopted in our pseudonym generation scheme. Fig. 3 shows
the proposed two-tier coding because a pseudonym in our
scheme is generated from two sequential processes. In the first
tier, IMSI and a watchword are mixed by the key generation
function to yield a cipher pseudonym. This can protect the
data ownership privacy during an authentication process. In the
second tier, the cipher pseudonym of the first tier is mixed with
random seeds to result in the second cipher pseudonym. We
use the second cipher pseudonym to protect the data privacy
when sharing data with others and storing data in an ODB.
Now we detail the proposed IGS algorithm. Initially, a
customer sends his/her genuine identity and KeyA to the
certifying server. If KeyA is certificated, the certifying server
generates an initial pseudonym (KeyB) by the input KeyA,
and then activates the login processor. Algorithm 1 describes
the detail procedures of the proposed pseudonym generation
algorithm. Note that the tolerance distance and the silence
period reflect the customers’ preferred privacy level and QoS
requirements. The former indicate the maximum acceptable
location bias of a customer, and the later specifies the period
of changing pseudonyms [37]. The pseudonym processor
exchanges KeyBs under the condition that the pseudonym
timer reaches the silence period and any other group member
is within the range of the tolerance distance. Otherwise, a new
KeyB will be regenerated. Since the pseudonyms are mixed
with nearby members’ pseudonyms, the proposed IGS algo-
rithm will impose ambiguity on a customer’s exact location
and thus protect his/her location privacy. Finally, a customer
uses the generated KeyB to update the current location.
B. Proposed IMSI-based Group Secure (IGS) Algorithm
In this subsection we detail the IGS algorithm and the
service procedures when applying the proposed pseudonym
5Algorithm 1 Pseudonym (KeyB) generation algorithm
1: if a customer sends the KeyA which is authorized by the
certifying server then
2: activate the login processor
3: generate and send KeyB to the customer
4: start a timer
5: else
6: send a reject information to the customer
7: end if
8: if timer ≥ silence period then
9: if tolerance distance ≥ distance(customer, a randomly
selected friend F within the same group) then
10: exchange KeyB of the customer and F and also reset
the timer
11: else
12: send a command of KeyB’s changing to the customer
and also reset the timer
13: end if
14: end if
generation algorithm in JOIN. Fig. 4(a) shows the register
process. Each customer should register a unique account.
Initially, a customer generates KeyA with his/her watchwords
and transmits KeyA to the server with password and genuine
identity. Fig. 4(b) shows the login process of the JOIN
services. A process thread is initiated and retained after the
verification of the identification and the password. Since
the thread is retained, the certifying server can identify the
customer in the communication afterwards. Furthermore, the
certifying server generates an initial KeyB from KeyA and a
random seed. Then the KeyB is delivered to the customer.
Fig. 5(a) shows the activity initiation process of the JOIN
services, where the dotted line and the solid line in this
figure is used to denote data stored in the memory and on
the hard disk, respectively. A customer can initiate a new
activity (i.e., invites friends to go somewhere) and receive
information of nearby friends by sending KeyB and location to
the server. Then the server sends the requests to all other group
members. Each certificated member has to send his/her KeyB
and locations to the server responding to this request. Next
the JOIN server searches the nearby friends from the location
record table and provides some group information (e.g., the
top 10 restaurants, coffee shops, or bakeries with fresh-baked
bread) from the service data in the cloud-based ODB. Then
this group information as well as KeyB and the location of the
nearby friends are sent to the certifying server. The certifying
server decodes KeyB with a genuine identity and generates a
new KeyB based on the proposed IGS algorithm. Finally, the
customer receives the service result from the certifying server.
Fig. 5(b) shows the storage process of the JOIN services.
The JOIN server stores each customer’s KeyB and location in
the cloud database. Note that storing a less accurate location
in the ODB can result in a higher privacy protection. For
example, storing New York City is more secure than storing
Manhattan in the database. Finally, data in the memory will
be cleared after the activity is finished.
V. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
A. Security Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we will prove that the proposed network
coding based pseudonym scheme can guarantee the unlinka-
bility of locations and customers to the unconditional security
level. Although the irreversibility feature of network coding
can prevent a hacker from deducing valuable information [32],
a hacker can still link the relation between the pseudonyms of
the same customer. Thus, the unlinkability feature is desirable
for a pseudonym scheme. First, the hardness assumptions for
Hash functions are given. Then we present the information-
theoretic security proof for the proposed network coding
pseudonym scheme. The security of the group LBS security
model is evaluated based on the probability of a hacker being
able to break into a security system. The basic idea of our
security system is to use a customer’s pseudonym to hide
his/her identity. The pseudonyms are generated by encrypting
the IMSI of the customer’s device through either network
coding or a Hash function.
Consider a scenario where adversary A can eavesdrop all
the links on the Internet, and know the detailed information of
key generation functions (i.e., Hash function or Vandermode
matrix A). The goal of this adversary is to find the correspon-
dence between the customer’s ID and his/her locations. Since
a customer’s (ID, KeyA) and (KeyB, location) are stored in
two separate storage nodes, adversary A can break the system
once the relations of (ID, KeyA) and (KeyB, location) are
known. A security problem for this kind of group LBS can be
formulated as follows.
IMSI Security Problem Given k(Ai) and k(Bj), determine
whether IMSIi = IMSIj . Here k(Ai) and k(Bj) represent
the i-th customer’s keyA and the j-th customer’s keyB gener-
ated from the same key generation function k(), respectively.
We denote the mixing of IMSI and watchwords as Ai and the
mixing of KeyA and random seeds as Bi.
Next, we derive the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Adversary A can find the correspondence between
ID and location if and only if A can correctly solve IMSI
Security Problem.
Proof: Assume that adversary A can find the correspon-
dence between ID and location. Given the location associated
with k(Bj), adversary A can know its corresponding ID of
the customer. By eavesdropping the link between the device
and the certifying server, adversary A can get the customer’s
k(Aj). If k(Aj) = k(Ai), the answer for IMSI Security
Problem is “YES”; otherwise, the answer is “NO”. By
contrast, assume an adversary A can solve IMSI Security
Problem. For any given k(Bj) and its corresponding location
l, adversary A can answer IMSI Security Problem for each
KeyA in the database records. If the answer is “YES” for a
certain KeyA with ID d, then d is located at l.
To reduce the possibility of IMSI Security Problem
to be solved, the hardness assumption of the Hash function
used as the key generation function is given as follows: It is
computationally infeasible in determining whether two output
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Fig. 4. Register and login process of the JOIN services.
Hash values lead to the fact that part of two corresponding
input messages are the same.
B. Analysis of Network Coding based Pseudonym
Now we evaluate our security framework for which network
coding techniques are used to encrypt the customer’s IMSI.
Referring to Theorem 1, the perfect privacy protection is to
ensure the probability of IMSI Security Problem being
solved is equal to the probability of random guessing. Next, we
give the definition that the considered LBS system is secure.
Definition 1 The system is secure if |Pr{An adversary cor-
rectly solves IMSI Security Problem} − 12 | ≤ ε, where
ε is negligible. Note that a function f : N → R is called
negligible if for every polynomial p there exists a positive
integer N(p) such that |f(n) ≤ 1
p(n) | for all n ≥ N(p).
Lemma 1 Assume an LBS system generate {k(Ai), k(Bj)}.
Let A[k(Ai), k(Bj)] be the guess of adversary A. If
Pr{A[k(Ai), k(Bj)] = Y es|IMSIi = IMSIj} ≤
1
2
+ ε1
(1)
and
Pr{A[k(Ai), k(Bj)] = No|IMSIi 6= IMSIj} ≤
1
2
+ ε2 ,
(2)
where ε1 and ε2 are negligible, then the system is secure.
Proof: Let
PY , Pr{A[k(Ai), k(Bj)] = Y es|IMSIi = IMSIj} (3)
and
PN , Pr{A[k(Ai), k(Bj)] = No|IMSIi 6= IMSIj} . (4)
Without loss of generality, assume an LBS system with only
two customers. We have that Pr{An adversary correctly solves
IMSI Security Problem} = 12PY +
1
2PN ≤
1
4 +
1
2ε1+
1
4 +
1
2ε2. Thus, it follows that |Pr{An adversary correctly solves
IMSI Security Problem} − 12 | ≤ ε, where ε =
1
2 (ε1 + ε2)
is negligible.
Next, we analyze the independence of the IMSI and the
generated pseudonyms.
Theorem 2 The information mutually held between IMSI
and KeyA or KeyB of a customer is I(k(Ai); IMSIi) =
I(k(Bj); IMSIj) = 0, where the mutual information I() is
defined by I(X ;Y ) = ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x, y) log
(
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
)
.
Proof: Let e(h) represent a subset containing arbitrary h
components of vector e. Denote ei:j as the subvector formed
from the i-th to the j-th position of vector e. The set of the
i-th and the j-th rows of matrix D is represented as Di:j .
Assume that the length of IMSI be m and the length KeyA and
KeyB be k. Represent b as the uncoded data (e.g., the mixing
of IMSI and watchwords), where bi are uniformly distributed
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independent random variables over Fq with entropy H(bi) =
H(b), and H() is defined by H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi) logp(xi).
For simplicity, the key is selected from arbitrary contiguous
k components of c = (c1, · · · , cn)T = Ab. The mutual
information I(cp+1:p+k;b(m)) for 0 ≤ p ≤ n − k can be
calculated as:
I(cp+1:p+k;b
(m))
= I(b(m); cp+1:p+k)
= H(b(m))−H(b(m)|cp+1:p+k) , (5)
where
H(b(m)|cp+1:p+k)
=
m∑
j=1
H(bseq(j)|cp+1:p+k,
bseq(j−1) = bˇseq(j−1), · · · , bseq(1) = bˇseq(1)) , (6)
In (6) seq(j) is the j-th element of a random integer sequence
within the range 1 to n, and bˇi represents the given value for
the random variable bi. Since the n× n Vendermonde matrix
A is nonsingular [38], we can apply the Gaussian elimination
to obtain the reduced row echelon form of the submatrix S, in
8Mp + 1:p + k =


mp1 ... m
p
p 1 ... 0 m
p
p+k+1 ... m
p
n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
mp+k−11 ... m
p+k−1
p 0 ... 1 m
p+k−1
p+k+1 ... m
p+k−1
n

 (7)
[Si,j ] = [Ai,j ], p+1 ≤ i, j ≤ p+ k. Then Adversary Reduced
Matrix M is obtained as (7), where the other element of M
are the same as A. We can also obtain Adversary Reduced
vector v of which the elements vp+1 · · · vp+k are represented
as
vp + 1:p + k =


vp+1
.
.
.
vp+k

 . (8)
Each element in M and v results from the basic row operations
to reduce S to Ik. Thus, we obtain k equations to solve n
unknown elements bi:
vi =
p∑
j=1
mi−1j bj + bi +
n∑
j=p+k+1
mi−1j bj , (9)
where p+1 ≤ i ≤ p+k. Since we cannot solve any bi without
n− k components of b for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− k, it follows that
H(bseq(j)|cp+1:p+k, bseq(j−1) = bˇseq(j−1), · · · , bseq(1) = bˇseq(1))
= H(bseq(j))
= H(b) . (10)
For n−k ≤ j ≤ m, the number of equations is more than the
number of unknown elements. Thus, we obtain
H(bseq(j)|cp+1:p+k, bseq(j−1) = bˇseq(j−1), · · · , bseq(1) = bˇseq(1))
= 0 . (11)
Substituting (10) and (11) into (6), we have
H(b(m)|cp+1:p+k) =
{
mH(b) , m ≤ n− k
(n− k)H (b) , m > n− k
. (12)
Since bi are i.i.d random variables, it follows that
H(b(m)) = H
(
bseq(1), bseq(2), . . . , bseq(m)
)
= mH(b) . (13)
Finally, substituting (12) and (13) into (5), we can obtain
I
(
cp+1:p+k;b
(m)
)
=
{
0 , m ≤ n− k
(m− n+ k)H (b) , m > n− k
.
(14)
Note that we select k = n/2 and m ≤ n/2 in our network cod-
ing based pseudonym scheme to ensure I
(
cp+1:p+k;b
(m)
)
=
0.
According to Theorem 2, we know that KeyA or KeyB
are independent of IMSI. As a result, the probability for an
adversary to correctly solve IMSI Security Problem is the
same as random guessing. This is implied that
Pr {A [k (Ai) , k (Bj)] = Y es|IMSIi = IMSIj}
= Pr {A [k (Ai) , k (Bj)] = Y es}
=
1
2
≤
1
2
+ ε1 (15)
and
Pr {A [k (Ai) , k (Bj)] = No|IMSIi 6= IMSIj}
= Pr {A [k (Ai) , k (Bj)] = No}
=
1
2
≤
1
2
+ ε2 . (16)
Based on Lemma 1, we conclude that the proposed network
coding scheme can achieve the unconditional security level.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the security issues in terms of
privacy, authentication, and continuity for the proposed group
LBS scheme. Then, we compare the security performance
of the proposed pseudonym scheme with that of traditional
pseudonym schemes.
A. Data Ownership Privacy
As shown in the previous section, network coding can
provide unconditional security rather than computational secu-
rity provided by Hash functions. Note that the unconditional
security property of the proposed IMSI pseudonym is con-
tributed from the uncertainty of the customer’s watchword.
Therefore, the privacy of location data ownership is fully
preserved even if one can eavesdrop IMSI, KeyA, or KeyB.
This property ensures that the proposed pseudonym scheme
can prevent the ownership information from being accessed by
eavesdroppers. For the same reason, our system is collusion-
resistant to the insider attack even when a service provider and
a cloud database provider collaboratively attempt to decrypt
the pseudonyms. Furthermore, it is discussed that the connec-
tion between a pseudonym and its ownership information can
be derived by analyzing messages (e.g., location and group
member information) subsequently [39]. In the proposed IGS
algorithm, customers’ keyB is exchanged randomly within
the same group after a silence period, thereby increasing the
difficulty of de-anonymization. Compared to the approach
using a new KeyB, the proposed method can confuse the
eavesdropper because the customers in the same group have
similar interests and movement patterns. The silence period
is a design parameter specified by a random variable within
9a certain range [37]. When the durations of two customers’
KeyBs are overlapped, the temporal relation of these two
customers cannot be correctly linked from the new KeyB
and the old KeyB. In general, a longer silence period results
in lower location timeliness (i.e., the elapsed time since the
location was acquired) but provides higher privacy protection.
Thus, a cloud database cannot store the precise locations
because they are strongly associated with customers. For
example, if a customer usually stays in one place, we can guess
that he/she may own the house. Fortunately, many group LBS
do not require precise locations for each customer. At last,
we notice that the collision issue (i.e., two or more customers
having the same KeyA/KeyB) will not happen in our proposed
scheme since the certifying server will check the validity of
each key in the login process.
B. Customer Authentication
With the help of the authentication center of cellular mobile
service operators, the proposed IMSI pseudonym can prevent
illegal access which will be blocked in the login process. In
the proposed IMSI pseudonym, a customer generates KeyA
based on his/her own IMSI. A customer can update location
information only if he/she is an authorized customer. Even if
an adversary can steal a customer’s SIM card to get IMSI,
this adversary still cannot log in to the system without the
customer’s watchword.
C. Service Continuity
In group LBS, service continuity is important because the
system provider can record and analyze the historical location
data of a customer. The proposed IMSI-based pseudonym can
retain the individual identification of a customer’s pseudonyms
because the unique IMSI is used in pseudonym generation.
Therefore, a customer can enquire his/her location record by
providing KeyA to the certifying server. In addition, historical
location can be used for social data mining services. In
contrast, most of conventional random pseudonym approach
will eliminate the individual identification of pseudonyms.
Therefore, new location data cannot be appended to the
same historic records when users change their identifications,
reinstall the program, or change devices. In this case, location
records become difficult to be traced since the ownership
information of a pseudonym is hard to be known. With the
uniqueness provided by IMSI, the proposed privacy protection
scheme can be operated and retain the service continuity
simultaneously.
D. Comparison with Conventional Pseudonym Schemes
Compared to conventional random pseudonym approaches,
the proposed network coding based pseudonym has the fol-
lowing advantages. First, as mentioned above, the proposed
IMSI pseudonym can further improve data ownership privacy,
customer authenticity, and service continuity. Especially, the
proposed pseudonym scheme can provide unconditional se-
curity rather than the computational security of Hash-based
pseudonym. The property of unconditional security offers
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great robustness against brute force attacks in cloud computing
environment. Besides, the designed two-tier coding method
can reduce the computational complexity and energy con-
sumption in mobile devices compared to Hash schemes. A
customer only needs to encode its identity one time when
logging in to the system. No further decoding procedures
are required. Moreover, the designed certifying server can
authenticate and authorize individual customers. Note that the
certifying server handles the key collision and uncloaks the
pseudonym only according to one’s keyB. Thus, the certifying
process can be implemented in a distributed manner to avoid
the service bottleneck and the single point of failure in the
system [40], [41]. Last but not least, the proposed network
coding based pseudonym is compatible with the existing
pseudonym approaches and security communication protocols
such as IP security (IPSec) and secure socket layer (SSL).
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Since mobile devices should perform key generation when
customers log in to the LBS or update their locations, pro-
cessing delay and power consumption for key generation
function are important performance issues. The applications of
network coding may be limited because of the computational
complexity and energy consumption in mobile devices [42]. To
examine the delay performance and the energy consumption
of the proposed network coding scheme, we implemented
the JOIN services and performed experiments based on HTC
Desire with a Qualcomm QSD8250, which is a low-power
ARM based 1 GHZ processor. We choose the three most
widely used Hash functions (i.e., MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-2),
and network coding schemes with different Galois field sizes.
Figure 6 shows the processing time versus the length of
IMSI for different key generation schemes. One can observe
that the processing time of SHA increases sharply when the
length of IMSI is around 140 bits. This is because input data
are broken down into chunks for processing in SHA and MD5.
Chunks of input data will be appended to fit in with the chunk
size. Also, the processing time of network coding approach is
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schemes.
not highly affected by Galois field size because the Galois field
mathematical operations are always in the range of field size
rather than growing exponentially. Finally, it is important to
note that the processing time of network coding is shorten than
that of Hash functions when the IMSI length is shorter than
120 bits. In the existing communication systems, a standard
IMSI is usually 50 bits long or even shorter. Our results show
that using network coding to encrypt a standard IMSI can
reduce more than 95% of processing time in mobile devices
compared to using Hash functions.
Figure 7 shows the system energy consumption versus
running time for different key generation schemes. The system
energy, including both coding energy and transmission energy,
is tested with eight packets coded together, each of one KB
length, and a transmission energy per bit of 200 pJ/bit [43].
Paper [43] has identified when a small field size is used, the
total system energy consumption is dominated by the extra
RF retransmissions. In contrast, as field size becomes large,
significantly increased energy is required for performing the
coding process with less influence on the expected number of
transmitted packets. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the
optimal field size of the proposed network coding scheme in
terms of energy consumption. As shown in Fig. 7, although
network coding with field size 210 consumes more energy
compared to MD5 or SHA, network coding with field size 28
can reduce about 10% of the energy consumption compared
to MD5 or SHA. Hence, we can conclude that network coding
with field size 28 is a promising function for energy-limited
devices. Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that the proposed
scheme can provide unconditional security with any network
coding parameters.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight network coding
pseudonym scheme to protect the ownership of mobile data
in an untrusted cloud database by disconnecting the relation
of data and its identity. We develop the IMSI-based group
secure (IGS) algorithm for group LBS based on the proposed
pseudonym scheme. Our theoretical results show that the
proposed scheme can achieve unconditionally secure privacy
protection. Our experimental results indicate that the proposed
network coding based pseudonym cannot only exhibit better
delay performance, but also provide lower energy consumption
compared to Hash-based pseudonyms. Our proposed scheme
is fully compatible with existing data security techniques. This
work is the first step to exploit the potential of network coding
in providing secure pseudonym. Besides the LBS, we will
further investigate the applicability and limitation of network
coding based pseudonym in the applications of machine-to-
machine (M2M) communications.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Reilly, S. Dashti, M. Ervasti, J. D. Bray, S. D. Glaser, and A. M.
Bayen, “Mobile phones as seismologic sensors: Automating data extrac-
tion for the iShake system,” IEEE Transactions on Automation Science
and Engineering, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 242–251, 2013.
[2] S. Yu, “Big privacy: Challenges and opportunities of privacy study in
the age of big data,” IEEE access, vol. 4, pp. 2751–2763, 2016.
[3] L. J. Chen, C. R. Hong, D. Deng, H. C. Lee, and H. H. Hsieh,
“SUDO: a secure database outsourcing solution for location-based
systems,” International Workshop on Privacy in Geographic Information
Collection and Analysis, p. 4, 2014.
[4] S. M. Khan and K. W. Hamlen, “AnonymousCloud: A data ownership
privacy provider framework in cloud computing,” IEEE 11th Interna-
tional Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and
Communications, pp. 170–176, 2012.
[5] W. Lou and K. Ren, “Security, privacy, and accountability in wireless
access networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 16, August 2009.
[6] Y. Zhu, D. Ma, D. Huang, and C. Hu, “Enabling secure location-based
services in mobile cloud computing,” Proceedings of the Second ACM
SIGCOMM Workshop on Mobile Cloud Computing, 2013.
[7] A. Beresford and F. Stajano, “Location privacy in pervasive computing,”
IEEE Pervasive Computing, pp. 46–55, Jan-Mar 2003.
[8] D. Singele´e and B. Preneel, “Location privacy in wireless personal area
networks,” Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Wireless security,
2006.
[9] J. M. del ´Alamo, A. M. Ferna´ndez, R. Trapero, J. C. Yelmo, and M. A.
Monjas, “A privacy-considerate framework for identity management in
mobile services,” Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 16, no. 4, pp.
446–459, 2011.
[10] Z. Zhu and G. Cao, “Toward privacy preserving and collusion resistance
in a location proof updating system,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 51–64, 2013.
[11] X. Liu, K. Liu, L. Guo, X. Li, and Y. Fang, “A game-theoretic approach
for achieving k-anonymity in location based services,” IEEE Conference
on Computer Communications, pp. 2985–2993, 2013.
[12] R. Lu, X. Li, T. H. Luan, X. Liang, and X. Shen, “Pseudonym changing
at social spots: An effective strategy for location privacy in vanets,”
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 86–96,
2012.
[13] S. Mathews and B. Jinila, “An effective strategy for pseudonym
generation & changing scheme with privacy preservation for vanet,”
International Conference on Electronics and Communication Systems,
2014.
[14] F. Julien, M. M. Hossein, H. Jean, and P. David, “Non-cooperative loca-
tion privacy,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 84–98, 2013.
[15] B. Ying, D. Makrakis, and H. Mouftah, “Dynamic mix-zone for location
privacy in vehicular networks,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 17,
no. 8, pp. 1524 – 1527, 2013.
[16] C. Teat and S. Peltsverger, “The security of cryptographic hashes,”
Proceedings of the 49th ACM Annual Southeast Regional Conference,
2011.
[17] H. Kumar, S. Kumar, R. Joseph, D. Kumar, S. K. S. Singh, A. Kumar,
and P. Kumar, “Rainbow table to crack password using md5 hashing
algorithm,” IEEE Conference on Information and Communication Tech-
nologies, 2013.
[18] M. Gruteser and D. Grunwald, “Anonymous usage of location-based
services through spatial and temporal cloaking,” The First International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services, 2003.
11
[19] B. Gedik and L. Liu., “Location privacy in mobile systems: A person-
alized anonymization model,” International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems, 2005.
[20] C.-Y. Chow and M. F. Mokbel, “Privacy in location-based services: A
system architecture perspective,” The SIGSPATIAL Special: Letters on
Privacy in Location-based Services, 2009.
[21] K. Miura and F. Sato, “A hybrid method of user privacy protection
for location based services,” International Conference on Complex,
Intelligent, and Software Intensive Systems, 2013.
[22] A. Gurjar and A. B. Patil, “Cluster based anonymization for source
location privacy in wireless sensor network,” International Conference
on Communication Systems and Network Technologies, 2013.
[23] B. Ying and D. Makrakis, “Protecting location privacy with clustering
anonymization in vehicular networks,” IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications Workshops, 2014.
[24] R. Koetter and M. Me´dard, “An algebraic approach to network coding,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 782–795,
2003.
[25] W. Qiao, J. Li, and J. Ren, “An efficient error-detection and error-
correction (EDEC) scheme for network coding,” IEEE Global Telecom-
munications Conference, pp. 1–5, 2011.
[26] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung, “Network coding and error correction,”
Proceedings of the IEEE Information Theory Workshop, pp. 119–122,
2002.
[27] D. Zeng, S. Guo, Y. Xiang, and H. Jin, “On the throughput of two-way
relay networks using network coding,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel
and Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 191–199, 2014.
[28] J. P. Vilela, L. Lima, and J. Barros, “Lightweight security for network
coding,” IEEE International Conference on Communications, pp. 1750–
1754, 2008.
[29] H. C. Chen, Y. Hu, P. P. Lee, and Y. Tang, “NCCloud: a network-
coding-based storage system in a cloud-of-clouds,” IEEE Transactions
on Computers, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 31–44, 2014.
[30] Y.-J. Chen, L.-C. Wang, and C.-H. Liao, “Eavesdropping prevention for
network coding encrypted cloud storage systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 27, no. 8, pp. 2261–2273, 2016.
[31] H. C. Chen and P. P. Lee, “Enabling data integrity protection in
regenerating-coding-based cloud storage: Theory and implementation,”
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no. 2,
pp. 407–416, 2014.
[32] P. F. Oliveira, L. Lima, T. T. Vinhoza, J. Barros, and M. Medard,
“Coding for trusted storage in untrusted networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1890–1899,
2012.
[33] F. Chen, T. Xiang, Y. Yang, and S. S. Chow, “Secure cloud storage
meets with secure network coding,” IEEE Transactions on Computers,
vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 1936–1948, 2016.
[34] Y. J. Chen and L. C. Wang, “A security framework of group location-
based mobile applications in cloud computing,” IEEE Parallel Process-
ing Workshops, 2011.
[35] Y. T. Lee, L. C. Wang, and R. H. Gau, “Implementation issues of
location-based group scheduling for cloud applications,” IEEE VTS Asia
Pacific Wireless Communications Symposium Conference, May 2010.
[36] Q. Chai and G. Gong, “Verifiable symmetric searchable encryption for
semi-honest-but-curious cloud servers,” IEEE International Conference
on Communications, pp. 917–922, 2012.
[37] L. Huang, K. Matsuura, H. Yamane, and K. Sezaki, “Enhancing wireless
location privacy using silent period,” IEEE Wireless Communications
and Networking Conference, 2005.
[38] A. Klinger, “The Vandermonde matrix,” The American Mathematical
Monthly, 1967.
[39] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing social networks,”
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2009.
[40] Q. Zhang, J. Zheng, Y. Tan, R. Wang, and Y. Li, “Cross-domain
authentication alliance protocol based on isomorphic groups,” Journal
of Computers, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 650–656, 2011.
[41] J. Li and F. Bai, “A distributed cross-realm identification scheme based
on hyperchaos system,” Advances in Computer Science, Intelligent
System and Environment, pp. 147–152, 2011.
[42] U. Lee, S.-H. Lee, K.-W. Lee, and M. Gerla, “Understanding processing
overheads of network coding-based content distribution in VANETs,”
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 24, no. 11,
pp. 2304–2318, 2013.
[43] G. Angelopoulos, M. Me´dard, and A. P. Chandrakasan, “Energy-aware
hardware implementation of network coding,” Springer Networking
Workshops, 2011.
Yu-Jia Chen received the B.S. degree and Ph.D.
degree in electrical engineering from National Chiao
Tung University, Taiwan, in 2010 and 2016, re-
spectively. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow in
National Chiao Tung University. His research inter-
ests include network coding for secure storage in
cloud datacenters, software defined networks (SDN),
and sensors-assisted applications for mobile cloud
computing. Dr. Chen has published 15 conference
papers and 3 journal papers. He is holding one US
patent and two ROC patent.
Li-Chun Wang (M’96 – SM’06 – F’11) received
the B.S. degree from National Chiao Tung Uni-
versity, Taiwan, R.O.C. in 1986, the M.S. degree
from National Taiwan University in 1988, and the
Ms. Sci. and Ph. D. degrees from the Georgia
Institute of Technology , Atlanta, in 1995, and 1996,
respectively, all in electrical engineering.
From 1990 to 1992, he was with the Telecommu-
nications Laboratories of Chunghwa Telecom Co. In
1995, he was affiliated with Bell Northern Research
of Northern Telecom, Inc., Richardson, TX. From
1996 to 2000, he was with AT&T Laboratories, where he was a Senior
Technical Staff Member in the Wireless Communications Research Depart-
ment. Since August 2000, he has joined the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering of National Chiao Tung University in Taiwan and is
the current Chairman of the same department. His current research interests
are in the areas of radio resource management and cross-layer optimization
techniques for wireless systems, heterogeneous wireless network design, and
cloud computing for mobile applications.
Dr. Wang won the Distinguished Research Award of National Science
Council, Taiwan in 2012, and was elected to the IEEE Fellow grade in 2011
for his contributions to cellular architectures and radio resource management
in wireless networks. He was a co-recipient(with Gordon L. Stuber and Chin-
Tau Lea) of the 1997 IEEE Jack Neubauer Best Paper Award for his paper
“Architecture Design, Frequency Planning, and Performance Analysis for a
Microcell/Macrocell Overlaying System,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 836-848, 1997. He has published over 200
journal and international conference papers. He served as an Associate Editor
for the IEEE Trans. on Wireless Communications from 2001 to 2005, the
Guest Editor of Special Issue on ”Mobile Computing and Networking” for
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications in 2005, ”Radio Resource
Management and Protocol Engineering in Future Broadband Networks”
for IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine in 2006, and ”Networking
Challenges in Cloud Computing Systems and Applications,” for IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications in 2013, respectively. He is holding 10
US patents.
